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Abstract 
This study tests for the presence of periodically, partially collapsing speculative bubbles in the sector 
indices of the S&P 500 using a regime-switching approach. We also employ an augmented model that 
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1990s and subsequently collapsed was surprisingly pervasive in the US equity market and it affected 
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1. Introduction 
Equity markets have historically enjoyed periods of spectacular growth in prices followed by rapid 
reversals. Such phenomenal price movements have motivated the development of asset-pricing models that 
try to explain the evolution of prices as well as to produce profitable forecasts for investment decisions. 
Nevertheless, many of these models often fail to predict the movement of prices in financial markets 
accurately, especially in times of high volatility in asset returns. This failure is sometimes attributed to an 
inability of these models to capture ‘fundamental values’ accurately. Other researchers claim that, in certain 
periods, fundamental values seem to be irrelevant in the pricing of financial assets. The behavior of stock 
market prices prior to the 1929 and 1987 stock market crashes are the most frequently cited examples of 
such periods of fundamental value irrelevance (see for example White (1990), Rappoport and White (1994), 
Shiller (2000)). The evolution of stock market prices in these two periods has inspired the search for other 
factors, beyond fundamentals, that might affect market prices and thus cause their ‘apparent’ deviations 
from fundamental values. One possible explanation for these deviations is the presence of speculative 
bubbles.  
 
Following Shiller’s (1981) seminal paper, several indirect and direct methodologies have been developed to 
test for the presence of bubbles in equity, currency and commodities markets and in monetary data. Indirect 
tests are based on the identification of bubbles through an examination of the distributional properties of 
actual prices (or returns) and fundamental values (see for example Shiller (1981), LeRoy and Porter (1981), 
Blanchard and Watson (1982)), through tests for cointegrating relationships between actual prices and 
fundamental values (see Meese (1986), Campbell and Shiller (1987), Diba and Grossman (1988a), Hall et 
al. (1999)),
1
 or through an examination of the specifications of the present value relationship and the actual 
relationship between prices and dividends (see Meese (1986), West (1987), Dezhbakhsh and Demirguc-
Kunt (1990)).  
 
Since indirect tests are usually a joint test of bubble absence and of the validity of the present value model 
(see Kleidon (1986a,b), West (1988)), they are usually argued to provide only ‘hints’ of bubble presence 
and not proof. Direct tests by contrast examine the presence of specific forms of speculative bubbles by 
identifying the presence of bubble-like behavior in financial and macroeconomic data. Direct tests have 
focused on the presence of deterministic bubbles (Flood and Garber (1980), Salge (1997)), fads (Summers 
(1986), Cutler et al. (1991)) and on the presence of periodically collapsing speculative bubbles (McQueen 
                                                     
1
 Hall et al. (1999) formulate a test that is able to identify periodically collapsing speculative bubbles and as such, it 
can be classified as a direct bubble test. However, because it is based on the identification of periods of explosive 
behavior in macroeconomic data through a switching augmented Dickey Fuller test, we have classified it as an indirect 
test of bubble presence. 
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and Thorley (1994), van Norden (1996), van Norden and Schaller (1999), Bohl (2000), Sornette and 
Johansen (1997)). 
 
In an important paper, van Norden and Schaller (1999)
2
 (hereafter vNS) propose a switching regime 
speculative behavior model that tests for the presence of periodically partially collapsing speculative 
bubbles. vNS construct a switching model of returns with a state independent probability of switching 
regimes. Although direct tests find mixed evidence of speculative bubbles, all of these tests, with the 
exception of Sornette and Johansen (1997), assume that bubble crashes are exogenous events. However, it 
is usually thought that bubble collapses are a result of a change in investors’ beliefs concerning the future of 
the bubble. Brooks and Katsaris (2005b) augment the model of vNS for testing for the presence of 
periodically partially collapsing speculative bubbles by including observed abnormal volume as a predictor 
of the time of the crash. They argue that abnormal volume is a predictor and a classifier of returns because 
it can provide information to investors about the belief of the market in the future of the bubble. Since all 
investors have access to information about past trading volume, upon the observation of increased volume 
in the market, they perceive that other investors are liquidating the bubbly asset and thus, they may rush to 
liquidate their holdings. This will cause a bubble collapse. Collapses, in this case, are caused endogenously 
since more investor selling leads to an increased supply of the asset.  
 
A possible explanation for the initial drop followed by the significant increase in equity prices during the 
last 25 years of the twentieth century is offered by Zeira (1999). In his study, Zeira presents a model of 
stock market booms and crashes caused by the uncertainty investors face about fundamental values. In 
effect, market booms are caused by informational overshooting when new technologies are implemented in 
the production process and the limit of such technologies is unknown. Once the limit of this ‘new’ 
technology is reached, market participants realize that no further growth is possible and thus cause market 
prices to crash. This model can be transformed to explain market booms and crashes using the arrival of 
new investors to the market (‘greater fools’) or the liberalization of monetary policy by central banks. Zeira 
claims that this model is capable of partly explaining the booms and crashes of 1929, 1987 and the boom of 
the Information Technology Era, but for his model to be able to explain historical ‘bubble-like’ episodes 
would require that the arrival and ‘death’ of new technologies is synchronized and that investors are myopic 
                                                     
2
 vNS’s approach is based on previous work by van Norden and Schaller (1993) who examined whether apparent 
deviations from dividend based fundamentals are able to predict stock market crashes and rallies. In their original 
paper, they used data on the Toronto Stock Exchange Composite Index and found that the speculative behavior model 
has significant explanatory power for excess stock market returns, since the ex ante conditional probability of a bubble 
collapse increases prior to many actual stock market crashes and rallies. 
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and do not adapt their expectations to information about the limits of the technology, revealed before the 
limit is reached.
3
  
 
The variation in the prices of S&P 500 stocks during the 1990s is particularly difficult to explain. One 
possible approach is presented by Greenwood and Jovanovic (1999) and Hobijn and Jovanovic (2000). In 
their studies, they present a model of technological change that can replicate booms and crashes observed in 
financial data and can explain stock market valuations during the last 25 years. The main suggestion of the 
model is that new technologies destroy old, incumbent firms
4
 once the success of the new technology is 
made known to the market. Since new technologies are rarely formed by listed companies, and because 
listed companies usually resist their implementation, stock market valuations are depressed once new 
technologies are invented. This is because once small innovative firms are listed on the market, investors 
shift their attention to such companies and neglect ‘old’ technology firms that have lower growth potential. 
However, this transition is smooth through time and thus stock market valuations may appear to be under-
valued for prolonged periods. Hobijn and Jovanovic (2000) present empirical evidence that supports their 
theory and state that the low market valuations in the 1970s were a result of the anticipation of the 
information technology era, and that during this period, ‘old’ technology firms were rationally being sold 
by investors. This was because a large claim to future dividends was not listed in the stock market yet, since 
most innovation was performed by small private firms. Furthermore, their model suggests that the 
extraordinary growth of stock market valuations in the 1990s is the result of the long awaited productivity 
gains from the implementation of IT in the production process and the subsequent ‘third industrial 
revolution’. However, the Hobijn and Jovanovic model does not provide any explanation for the 1987 stock 
market crash. As a final possibility, they consider whether the evolution of stock prices could be explained 
by the presence of a speculative bubble, “Is the stock market bubble-prone? Did a positive bubble burst, or 
a negative bubble form some time between 1968-1974? And today, do we see a positive bubble, especially 
in internet stocks?”5 
 
In this paper, we will examine the evolution of the S&P 500 and its constituent sectors during the period 
January 1973 – June 20046 in more detail in order to see whether the periodically collapsing speculative 
                                                     
3
 A model of technological growth that leads to booms and crashes, that allows for investor learning through the 
reduction of uncertainty about the limits of new technologies as these technologies become older, is presented in 
Jovanovic and Rob (1990). However, as uncertainty decreases in this model, so does the size of the ‘bad’ surprise in 
investor expectations. 
4
 Hobijn and Jovanovic (2000) claim that the prices of firms in IT-intensive sectors should be better explained by the 
model and thus sectors with the highest IT investment after 1973 should experience the largest drops in value and then 
the largest increases. These sectors are Finance, Insurance and Real Estate, and the service sector in general. 
5
 Hobijn and Jovanovic (2000) p. 29. 
6
 We were only able to obtain sector data after January 1973 and thus we will restrict our analysis to this period. In 
addition, the definition of the GICS sectors changed substantially during our sample period and since the time elapsed 
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bubble models can explain the apparent bubble deviations of actual prices from fundamental values. 
Furthermore, in order to examine whether all sectors within the S&P 500 displayed bubble behavior during 
this period, we will estimate a speculative behavior model using sector data in an effort to see which sectors 
are responsible for the bubble like behavior of the aggregate S&P 500. If we find that only the IT sector, or 
the high growth sectors in general, contain a speculative bubble, then this could imply that bubbles are a 
statistical artefact caused by the use of dividend-based fundamentals.
7
 If, however, we find that other 
sectors that could be valued more accurately using dividends also contain bubble deviations, this could be 
evidence that bubbles are endemic rather than being caused by the presence of bubbles in one or two 
fashionable sectors. To our knowledge, we are the first to test whether sector market prices contain bubbles 
and to see whether bubble-like behavior is present throughout the entire S&P 500 Composite Index. In 
addition, we develop a joint model for cross-sectional contagion of bubbles across sectors and we examine 
whether there is evidence for bubble spillovers. 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the methodology used to construct the ten 
sector indices and provides descriptive statistics. Section 3 presents the bubble models that we employ, 
while Section 4 discusses the empirical results. Section 5 presents the multivariate bubble model and 
Section 6 provides some concluding remarks. 
 
2. Definitions and Discussion of the S&P 500 and GICS sectors 
This paper employs data on the 10 S&P 500 Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) sector indices. 
The GICS is an industry classification system created by Standard & Poor’s in collaboration with Morgan 
Stanley Capital International that is used to classify firms into 10 sectors, 23 industry groups, 59 industries 
and 122 sub-industries according to their principal business activity. The sectors we examine are: Cyclical 
Services, Financials, Basic Industries, General Industrials, Cyclical Consumer Goods, IT, Non-Cyclical 
Consumer Goods, Non-cyclical Services, Resources, and Utilities. The indices that correspond to these 
sectors are calculated using the same principles as the S&P 500 Composite Index. The appropriate series 
are then transformed into real series using the monthly CPI, and the implied cash dividends are obtained 
from the dividend yield, using the methodology described in Brooks and Katsaris (2005a). We obtain all 
our data from Datastream. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                              
following the modification is insufficient for us to estimate the models, we are forced to restrict the sample period to 
end in 2004.  
7
 The Information Technology sector is the only sector in which more than 50% of its member firms do not pay 
dividends. Note, however, that this percentage has decreased dramatically since the 1990s and that for all other sectors 
the percentage of dividend payers remains higher than 50%. But in order for the results of our analysis to be directly 
comparable across sectors, we still construct dividend-based fundamentals for this one as well.  
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We now examine the evolution of sector prices and implied dividends across time. As examples, in Figures 
1 to 3 we present the monthly real GICS sector indices and the monthly real dividend yields for the 
Information Technology (IT), General Industrials and Resources sectors respectively. From Figure 1, we 
note that the IT Sector had only grown by around 40% until January 1996, yielding most of its 
extraordinary growth of 650% to the peak in the following five years of the sample before the equally 
spectacular collapse in value from April 2000. By contrast, the S&P 500 Composite Index (not shown) had 
grown by just over 200% in the same period. Furthermore, from the graphs we can see that the dividend 
yields decreased to all time lows in 2000 before recovering only slightly by 2004. Interestingly, the General 
Industrials sector (Figure 2) shows a remarkably similar pattern to the IT sector, although the price growth 
of the former is somewhat less spectacular than the latter. Thus many “old economy” sectors also appeared 
to show bubble-like growth in the 1990s. The only sector that does not exhibit such behavior in the slightest 
is Resources (Figure 3). In that case, the run up in prices is far less pronounced and there appeared to have 
been no substantial fall in valuations by the end of the sample period.  
 
Other periods of very low dividend yields (1929, 1973, and 1987) have been followed by significant 
corrections in S&P 500 market values, and this fact can also be observed for the individual sectors. The 
General Industrials index has a very similar evolution to the S&P 500 Composite, although it grows at a 
higher average rate, and the implied bubble deviations (see below) have a similar evolutionary pattern to the 
S&P 500 Composite. Note that this sector has a stable participation in the S&P 500 over the last 25 years 
that ranges between 10 and 15%. When, however, we examine the Information Technology sector, we find 
that until 1995, this sector had a fairly constant participation in the S&P 500, and the implied bubble 
deviations were fairly average in size. Nevertheless, after 1993 there is a persistent and increasing positive 
bubble deviation that reaches 90% before it begins to deflate, causing the IT index to lose around two thirds 
of its value.  
 
As stated above, some critics may argue that the comparison of prices and dividends is not an effective 
measure of the relative performance for all sectors, especially for high technology sectors. For this reason, 
we also examine the evolution of prices relative to earnings-price ratios.
8
 We find again that the earnings-
price ratio is low prior to several corrections in prices, whereas it is quite high before significant market 
advances. Overall, in the last 10 years of our sample, the earnings-price ratios are quite low for most sectors 
and especially low for IT. Note that traditionally, high P/E ratios denote a market expectation of high future 
earnings growth. Therefore, we should expect that the E/P ratio for the high growth sectors in our sample 
should be lower than the E/P ratios of the Utilities and Materials sectors. However, several researchers and 
market practitioners argue that the evolution of prices in the 1990s resulted in unrealistically low E/P ratios 
                                                     
8
 Not shown due to space constraints but available from the authors on request. 
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(high P/E ratios) in both technology and traditional sectors. For example, several dot.com companies had 
P/E ratios larger than 1000 at the peak of the internet ‘bubble’. 
 
Overall, from the graphs, we note that the GICS sector indices display behavior that could be considered 
consistent with the existence of speculative bubbles. That is, an apparent under-valuation relative to 
dividends in the 1970s, an increasing over-valuation up until 1987, and an ever increasing overvaluation 
after that. However, some sector indices display significantly more variation around dividends than others. 
In the next sections, we will construct and describe the statistical properties of these bubble deviations and 
then test whether the evolution of market values of the 10 sectors is consistent with the presence of 
speculative bubbles. 
 
3. Models for Periodically Partially Collapsing Speculative Bubbles in Asset Prices 
Under the assumptions of rational expectations, risk-neutrality, constant discount rates and market 
equilibrium, the no arbitrage condition must hold and thus the price of a stock must be given by the present 
value of its future cash flows: 
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In equation (1), 
a
tp  is the actual price of the stock at time t, td  is the dividend paid by the stock in period t, 
(.)tE is the mathematical expectations operator, and i  is the constant expected real rate of return in 
equilibrium that is equal to the discount rate.
9
 Equation (1) shows that the actual price of a stock must be 
equal to the present value of the expected future price at which the security will be sold plus the expected 
dividend the investor will receive at time t+1. 
 
If we allow for multi-period horizons, then equation (1) can be updated with the expectation of the price at 
t+1 and substituted into the original equation. Substituting recursively for all future prices in an infinite 
planning horizon and using the property of rational expectations that )(.)](.[ 221   ttttt EEE  will yield 
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If we allow the actual market price of the stock to deviate from its fundamental value, the actual stock-price 
can be described by the relationship: 
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f
t
a
t ubpp           (3) 
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 Fama and French state that the expected or required return of an asset is the discount rate that relates a present value 
with its future cash flows (Fama and French (1988)). 
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where tb  is the bubble component at period t, and tu  is a zero mean, constant variance error term that 
contains the unexpected innovation of both the bubble term and of the fundamental component. The bubble 
component ( tb ) is simply the difference between the actual price and the fundamental price of the security 
and is assumed here to have an evolutionary process that causes the systematic divergence of actual prices 
from their fundamental values.  
 
Blanchard (1979), and Blanchard and Watson (1982) formulate a speculative bubble model in which the 
bubble component continues to grow with explosive expectations in the next time period with probability q, 
or crashes to zero with probability 1-q. If the bubble collapses, the actual price will be equal to the asset’s 
fundamental value. In their model, the explosive behavior of bubble returns compensates the investor for 
the increased risk of a bubble crash as the bubble grows in size. However, according to this specification, if 
the bubble term in period t+1 crashes to zero then it cannot regenerate since the expected bubble is equal to 
zero. This implies that there can be only one observed bubble in any financial time series (Diba and 
Grossman (1988a)). Furthermore, the model requires the assumption that the bubble crashes immediately to 
its collapsing state value. These are restrictive assumptions, since it is plausible that there could be several 
bubble episodes in a financial time series or that a bubble could slowly deflate for several time periods. In 
1929 and 1987, the market peaked in late August and crashed in October whereas the strong correction in 
the Tokyo Stock Exchange took several months after January 1990. Moreover, the explosive nature of 
bubbles leads Diba and Grossman (1988b) to conclude that under rational expectations, negative bubbles 
cannot exist since investors cannot rationally expect the value of a stock to become negative in finite time. 
This arises since if a negative rational speculative bubble exists, the bubble will grow geometrically causing 
the stock price to decrease without bound and become negative in finite time.  
 
In order to lift the requirement for these unrealistic restrictions, van Norden and Shaller (hereafter vNS, 
1993) formulate a periodically partially collapsing, positive and negative speculative bubble model that has 
a time varying probability of collapse. Brooks and Katsaris (2005b) propose an extension of their model to 
incorporate a measure of abnormal volume in the equations for returns in the surviving regime and in the 
probability of bubble collapse. Their model may be expressed as: 
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In (4), ),( xtt VBq  is the probability of the bubble continuing to exist that is a function of the relative 
absolute size of the bubble and the measure of abnormal volume where 0/),(  t
x
tt BVBq  and 
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0/),(  xt
x
tt VVBq , and 
x
tV  is a measure of unusual volume in period t. Following vNS, in equation (4) 
the expected size of the bubble is a function of the probability of a crash, the size of the bubble at period t 
and the function )( tBu , which is the relative size of the bubble in the collapsing state. The probability of 
the bubble continuing to exist is a negative function of the absolute (since we allow negative bubbles to 
exist) size of the bubble, and the measure of abnormal volume. From (4) we can derive the gross returns on 
the stock when a bubble is present under the assumption that dividends follow a geometric random walk 
with a constant drift.
10
 Under this assumption, we can show that the expected next period gross returns are 
given by: 
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where rt+1 denotes the gross return of period t+1 conditioning the state at time t+1 being the surviving (S) or 
collapsing (C) state and on all other information at time t, Vq,  is the sensitivity of the probability of 
survival to the measure of abnormal volume, M is the gross fundamental return on the security and  is the 
standard normal cumulative density function. Note that the measure of abnormal volume affects the 
expected returns on the asset only indirectly through the probability of the process being in state S or C in 
period t+1. Abnormal volume is thus suggested to signal an increase in the size of the tail of the distribution 
of expected returns that would signify a collapse of the bubble. We follow vNS and select a probit model 
for the probability of survival ( )( 1 SWP t  ) since it satisfies the conditions set above and it ensures that 
probability estimates are bounded between zero and one. Furthermore, it should be noted that equations (5) 
through (7) satisfy the no-arbitrage condition since the ex ante expected gross return on the bubbly asset is 
equal to the expected gross return on the bubble-free asset (M) and therefore it is rational for a risk-neutral 
investor to hold the bubbly asset. The realized return if the bubble survives is greater than the required gross 
return (M), whereas if the bubble collapses it yields negative actual returns (positive in the case of a 
negative bubble).  
 
Equations (5)-(7) are non-linear and so for estimation they are linearized by taking the first order Taylor 
series approximation around an arbitrary B0 and 
xV0 to arrive at a linear switching regression model: 
S
t
x
tVStbSSt uVBr 1,,0,1           (8) 
C
ttbCCt uBr 1,0,1            (9) 
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 This is a common assumption in the literature; see for example Fama and French (1988), Kleidon (1986a). 
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where 
S
tu 1  is the unexpected gross return in the surviving regime and 
C
tu 1  is the unexpected gross return in 
the collapsing regime.  
 
Equation (8) states that the returns in the surviving regime are a function of the relative size of the bubble 
and of the measure of abnormal volume. In effect, equation (8) implies that as the bubble grows, investors 
demand higher returns in order to compensate them for the probability of a bubble collapse and since 
abnormal volume signals a possible change in the long run trend in equity prices, investors want to be 
compensated for this risk as well. The above linear switching regression model has a single state-
independent probability of switching regimes )( 1 SrP t  that is a function of the relative size of the bubble 
and of the measure of abnormal volume. We estimate the augmented model under the assumption of 
disturbance normality using maximum likelihood.
11
  
 
From the first order Taylor series expansion, we can derive certain conditions that must hold if the 
periodically collapsing speculative bubble model has explanatory power for stock market returns. If the 
above model can explain the variation in future returns, then this would be evidence in favor of the presence 
of periodically collapsing speculative bubbles in the data. These restrictions are: 
0,0, CS             (a) 
0, bC           (b) 
bCbS ,,             (c) 
0, bq           (d) 
0, Vq           (e) 
0, VS           (f) 
Restriction (a) implies that the mean return across the two regimes is different, so that there exist two 
distinct regimes, although we cannot say anything about the relative size of these coefficients. Restriction 
(b) implies that the expected return should be negative if the collapsing regime is observed. This means that 
the bubble must be smaller in the following period if the bubble collapses. Note that the opposite holds for 
negative bubbles: the larger the negative bubble, the more positive the returns in the collapsing regime. 
Restriction (c) ensures that the bubble yields higher (lower) returns if a positive (negative) bubble is 
observed in the surviving regime than in the collapsing regime. Restriction (d) must hold since the 
probability of the bubble continuing to exist is expected to decrease as the size of the bubble increases. 
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 Full details of the estimation procedure are presented in Brooks and Katsaris (2005a).  
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Restrictions (a) to (d) are equivalent to the restrictions derived by vNS. The additional restriction (e) must 
hold so that abnormally high volume signals an imminent collapse of the bubble. Finally, restriction (f) 
states that the coefficient on the abnormal volume measure in the state equation must be greater than zero 
since, as volume increases, investors perceive an increase in market risk.  
 
We examine the power of the model to capture bubble effects in the returns of the S&P 500 and its sectors 
by testing the model against three simpler specifications that capture stylized features of stock market 
returns. These models are nested within the speculative bubble model. Firstly, we examine whether the 
effects captured by the switching model can be explained by a more parsimonious model of changing 
volatility. In order to test this alternative, we follow vNS and jointly impose the following restrictions:  
0,0, SC                      (11.1) 
0,,,,,  VqbqVSbCbS                  (11.2) 
CS                      (11.3) 
Restriction (11.1) implies that the mean return across the two regimes is the same and restriction (11.2) 
states the bubble deviation has no explanatory power for next period returns or for the probability of 
switching regimes. The later point suggests that there is a constant probability of switching between a high 
variance and low variance regime as this is stated in restriction (11.3). 
 
In order to separate restrictions (11.1) and (11.2), we examine whether returns can be characterized by a 
simple mixture of normal distributions model, which only allows mean returns and variances to differ 
across the two regimes. This mixture of normal distributions model implies the following restrictions: 
0,,,,,  VqbqVSbCbS         (12) 
Another possible alternative is that of mean reversion in prices (fads) as described by Cutler et al. (1991). 
Under the fads model, returns are linearly predictable although mean returns do not differ across regimes. 
Furthermore, the deviation of actual prices from the fundamentals has no predictive ability for the 
probability of switching regimes. The returns in the two regimes are characterized by different variances of 
residuals but are the same linear functions of bubble deviations. The fads model is thus: 
1,01   tStb
S
t uBr   
1,01   tCtb
C
t uBr          (13) 
 )( 0,qtq   
In the above equations, ),0(~1 St Nu   with probability qt, ),0(~1 Ct Nu   with probability 1-qt.  
 
Measures of Fundamental Values 
A number of methods for constructing measures of fundamental values can be found in the literature, 
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including approaches based on dividend multiple measures, or based on an augmented Gordon growth 
model. The Campbell and Shiller (1987) methodology can allow for predictable time-variation in the 
growth rate of dividends, although the approach assumes that both the actual spread and the dividend 
growth rate are stationary. However, if the actual spread is not stationary, this may lead to spurious 
regression problems and inefficient forecasts of the theoretical spread for those sectors. We therefore adopt 
the dividend multiple measure of fundamentals employed by van Norden and Schaller (1999).
12
  Before 
describing this approach, we should state that we recognize the limitations of using dividend-based 
fundamentals to value high growth sectors such as Information Technology. It is a common view that such 
high growth sectors should not be valued according to tangible assets or balance sheets since most of the 
value added in such sectors originates from ‘soft’ variables, such as intellectual human capital, patents, 
strategic alliances, joint ventures, market share, and in the case of internet companies, other variables such 
as web traffic and number of unique visitors (see, for example, Rajgopal, Kotha and Venkatchalam (2000)). 
Nevertheless, Damodaran (2000) and Hand and Landsman (1999) argue and empirically show that the 
fundamentals of equity valuation still apply to high technology firms and that classic accounting variables 
are relevant in the pricing of such stocks. However, such valuations are very noisy and other ‘soft’ variables 
often complement high technology stock valuations. 
 
vNS (1999) show that if the discount rate is constant, then stock market prices follow the period-by-period 
arbitrage condition given by equation (1). Assuming that dividends follow a geometric random walk, i.e. 
that log dividends follow a random walk with a drift, it can be shown that the fundamental price of a stock 
will be equal to a multiple of current dividends: 
t
f
t dp              (14) 
where 
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. We use the sample mean of the price-dividend ratio to approximate  . In this 
setting, the relative bubble size is given by: 
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4. Empirical Evidence 
In this Section we will present the results of the models presented above for the S&P 500 Composite and 
the 10 GICS sector indices. The models we estimate are the original van Norden and Schaller model, and 
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 However, for the Cyclical Services, Financials, General Industrials, Cyclical Consumer Goods, IT and Non-
Cyclical Services sectors, the Campbell and Shiller methodology produces more robust results and so the results from 
their approach are presented for those sectors.    
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the augmented model that contains volume as a predictor and classifier of returns.
13
 In order to test for the 
no-bubble hypothesis, we perform likelihood ratio tests for the implied model restrictions on the coefficient 
estimates, and in order to ensure that we are not misinterpreting stylized facts about stock market returns 
such as volatility regimes, mixtures of normals and mean reversion as evidence in favor of bubbles, we use 
likelihood ratio tests in order to statistically verify that we are capturing more of the variability of returns 
than these simpler alternatives. 
 
In Table 1, we present the results for the S&P 500 Composite index and each of the sectors for the 
augmented vNS model using the dividend multiple measure of fundamental values for the period January 
1973 – June 2004. The first panel of the table contains the coefficient estimates for the nine models, the log-
likelihood function values at the optimum, and the three information criteria. The second panel contains the 
results of the likelihood ratio tests for the speculative behavior coefficient restrictions. Finally, the last panel 
of the table contains the LR test results of the alternative model specifications. Therefore, we test whether a 
mixture of normals can explain returns better than a simple volatility regimes model, and in turn whether a 
fads model captures any additional characteristics in the data.  
 
From the results, we can see that for the S&P 500 as a whole, the null hypothesis of no-bubbles can be 
rejected since most of the speculative behavior models’ restrictions are satisfied by the data (i.e. their 
respective nulls are rejected in favor of bubble behavior). Specifically, the bubble deviation is significant in 
predicting the levels and the generating state of returns (since S,B and q,B are both statistically significant 
respectively), and as the bubble grows, the returns in the surviving regime become increasingly higher 
(when a positive bubble is present) whereas the returns in the collapsing regime are a negative function of 
the bubble size (since C,B is negative). As the bubble grows, the probability of being in the surviving 
explosive regime (S) decreases and the expected return in the collapsing state becomes even smaller (when 
a positive bubble is present). Furthermore, the model identifies two distinct regimes of stock market returns: 
one in which small positive returns with small variance (S) are observed and one in which returns are large 
and negative and have large variance (C). The coefficient estimates appear to be consistent with the 
periodically collapsing speculative bubbles model, and it appears that the augmented model can capture an 
additional proportion of the variability of returns when we compare it to the three stylized alternatives of 
volatility regimes, fads and mixture of normals (although the latter test statistic is not quite statistically 
significant). Overall, there is a very small probability of being in the collapsing regime (q,0) when the 
bubble size is zero and volume is normal. Nevertheless, as the bubble increases, this probability increases 
dramatically. From the above, we can conclude that the divergence of the S&P 500 from the dividend 
multiple fundamental values can be considered the result of speculative behavior. Therefore, the Hobijn and 
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 In the interests of brevity, only the results from the augmented model are presented.  
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Jovanovic (2000) assertion that a bubble would not be able to explain the evolution of the S&P 500 in the 
last 25 years is not supported. 
 
Turning our attention to the sector indices, overall, the results are indicative of the presence of bubbles in 
several of the sectors, namely Financials, General Industrials, Information Technology and Non-Cyclical 
Services. There is also some evidence in favor of periodic, partially collapsing speculative bubbles in the 
Cyclical Services, Basic Industries and Utilities sectors. This leaves only three sectors for which there is 
virtually no evidence for bubble-like behavior. Let us now consider these results in greater detail. 
 
When we examine the Financials index, the collapsing explosive regime has a significantly lower average 
probability of occurring. Nevertheless, as the bubble grows, the probability of observing the collapsing 
regime increases dramatically since, if the measure of abnormal volume and the spread of actual returns are 
equal to zero, when the bubble size is equal to 50%, the probability of observing the collapsing regime is 
close to 50%. More importantly, all the coefficients have the right signs and are significantly different from 
zero, and the LR test results imply that the augmented model captures additional information contained in 
the index returns, so that the volatility regimes, mixture of normals and fads specifications are all rejected. 
 
Considering now the Resources index, a sector that is commonly considered to contain a bubble in the early 
1980s, the bubble deviations in the surviving state equation are statistically insignificant and not all of the 
theoretical restrictions are satisfied by the data, although all of the coefficient signs and magnitudes are 
correct. From the estimates of the model, we calculate that the probability of the next period returns being 
generated by the collapsing state in January 1982 was over 50%, a value much higher than it had taken 
previously during our sample period. The index lost 13% in February 1982, which provides anecdotal 
evidence that the speculative behavior model could potentially be used to predict the level and the 
generating state of returns. 
 
The same conclusions can be drawn if we examine the General Industrials and the Non-Cyclical Services 
sectors, since the information criteria indicate that the augmented speculative behavior model can better 
capture the variability of returns than alternative specifications. Furthermore, the coefficients in the state 
and classifying equations are significantly different from zero and have the correct sign, and the LR tests 
again reject the more parsimonious alternatives (in the latter case).  
 
Let us now examine the Information Technology sector. As noted earlier, this index experiences the largest 
increase over the sample period and contains the largest bubble deviation. All of the speculative behavior 
model coefficients have the correct sign and are statistically significant. Note that when the bubble 
deviation and the measure of abnormal volume are equal to zero, the probability of observing the collapsing 
regime is small although larger than for any other sector. But the responsiveness of the probability of being 
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in the collapsing regime to a growth in the size of the bubble is relatively modest. So it would take a bubble 
size in excess of 50% for the probability of the bubble surviving to fall below 50%. This result can be 
attributed to the fact that the estimated bubble deviation was extremely large in the 1990s but continued to 
grow even larger before eventually bursting.  
 
Turning now to the Resources and the Utilities sectors, we find that, contrary to common opinion that the 
Resources index contained a bubble in the early 1980s, this index is better explained by a simple volatility 
regimes model. However, we note that the speculative models’ coefficients are mostly still significant, and 
all have the expected signs. Similarly, when we examine the Utilities sector results, we find that the mixture 
of normals or fads models are able to capture the characteristics of returns better than any of the more 
complex specifications. This result is perhaps expected since this sector contains “old economy” stocks and 
the actual index varies around its fundamental values, so that the bubble deviations do not expand or 
collapse abruptly and thus there is only limited evidence for bubble-like behavior.
14
   
 
From the above, we can conclude that the bubble deviations of the S&P 500 from its dividend based 
fundamental values are a result of the deviation of not only the Information Technology sector but of the 
deviations of other, more traditional sectors from their fundamental values. This finding is in contrast to 
Hobijn and Jovanovic’s (2000) claim that the undervaluation of the 1970s can mainly be attributed to the 
Financials and the IT sectors. However, their model suggests that these sectors and the services sector in 
general should experience the highest growth in the 1980s and 1990s because of the listing on the stock 
market of new, high growth firms that contain a large share of the claim to future dividends. Unfortunately, 
we do not have the data to examine this hypothesis directly. 
 
If we now turn our attention to the 1990s, several sectors – namely the Cyclical Services, Non-Cyclical 
Services, Resources, General Industrials, Cyclical Consumer Goods, Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods and 
Information Technology indices – were overvalued by at least 30% in January 1996. These sectors 
represented more than 60% of the S&P 500 Composite index, which was overvalued in the same period by 
almost 40%. More importantly, we note that in January 2000, the estimated bubble deviation of the 
Composite index was 60%. One point worth noting is that after March 2000, when the bubble deviations in 
the aforementioned sectors began to deflate, sectors that were overvalued by less than 40% relative to the 
dividend multiple fundamental values in January 2000 (namely the Utilities, Financials and Basic Industries 
indices) experienced a relatively significant increase in their bubble deviations until the end of our sample 
period. These sectors accounted for around a quarter of the total capitalization of the Composite index in 
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 We also estimated all of the models using the Campbell and Shiller measure of fundamental values in order to 
examine the robustness of our results against fundamentals that allow for predictable variation in the dividend growth 
rate. These results are not presented here for brevity but can be obtained from the authors on request and are 
qualitatively identical to the results for the dividend multiple fundamental values.  
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January 2000, and by January 2001 their share had grown to over 30%. This could be taken as evidence that 
once investors realized that the bubble deviation was bursting, they shifted funds to relatively “safe” sectors 
with a smaller risk of observing a bubble collapse.  
 
5. Bubble Spillovers between Sectors 
Even a casual examination of Figures 1 to 3 reveals some divergence between the sectors in terms of when 
the fast growth phase of the bubble started and when the price index hit its peak. For example, the Basic 
Industries sector arguably started its strongest expansion phase in March 1995; it began its collapse in May 
1999 and then started to recover by October 2000 although it remained volatile. While General Industrials 
started its ascent at around the same time, the reversal in this case did not take place until September 2000. 
Similarly, the Information Technology sector, widely attributed as being the root of the tech bubble, 
showed no signs of slowdown until September 2000, more than a year after Basic Industries but a month 
before Utilities. The Resources sector grew fairly rapidly from February 1995 and became volatile from 
May 1998 although it largely avoided a full-scale collapse. The downfall in Financials did not start until 
February 2001 although it had fully recovered by April 2004. These anecdotal observations suggest that, 
contrary to popular opinion, even if the formation of the tech bubble can be attributed to Technology, 
Telecommunications and the Media, the subsequent collapse started with faltering prices in more 
conventional sectors that one might expect to be affected at the early stages of an impending economic 
slowdown (Basic Industries and Resources). This motivates us to examine whether a bubble that is present 
in one sector may subsequently spread to other sectors. 
 
We now proceed to build an empirical model that can allow for spillovers in both the levels of returns in the 
sectors and in the generating equations. While there is potentially a large number of ways that this could be 
achieved, we focus on a natural extension of the models that were described in Section 3. We also rule out 
contemporaneous spillovers between sectors, allowing only for lagged effects. Not only is this in the spirit 
of reduced form VAR modeling, but more importantly, it ensures that the equations do not suffer from 
under-identification. We let the returns in the surviving regime (equation (8)) depend on the lagged size of 
the bubble in all sectors (not just the lagged bubble size in that sector as was the case above) and on the 
lagged abnormal volume in all sectors; likewise, the return in the collapsing regime also depends on the one 
period lagged value of the size of the bubble in all sectors. The probability of being in the surviving regime 
will also be dependent upon the bubble sizes and volumes in all sectors:  
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where all notation is as above and the additional j subscript denotes each individual sector. The likelihood 
function used to estimate such a model will still have the same “shape” as for the analysis of each separate 
sector, but it will now be extended in the same spirit as the return equations: 
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The approach defined by equations (8)-(10) and (16) must be estimated ten times – one for each sector. 
For each of these ten models, the dependent variable would be different but the independent variables 
would be exactly the same. This model is likely to be tricky to estimate given that it contains a total of 55 
parameters. There are a number of ways we could simplify it, and some obvious possibilities are: 
1. Remove abnormal volume from the surviving regime equation (8) (and thus also in equation (16)). 
2. Remove abnormal volume from the state-determining equation (10). 
3. Remove volume from both (8) and (10). 
4. Make the model dependent on the bubble in the sector under consideration and in the market as a 
whole rather than all the other sectors. Equations (8) to (10) would thus become 
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where the additional subscript I denotes the stock index for the whole market.  
 
In order to avoid the inclusion of an excessive number of tables, we only report the results for the model 
corresponding to restriction 4 and the unrestricted case in Tables 2 and 3 respectively. It is clear from Table 
2 that both the levels equations and the probabilities of bubble collapse in a number of individual sectors 
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respond to the size of the bubble in the market as a whole as well as that in their own sector, and most of the 
additional parameters are statistically significant for the Cyclical Services, Information Technology, Non-
Cyclical Services, Resources and Utilities sectors. For example, in the case of the resources sector, the 
return in the surviving regime is a positive and significant function (S,B,I) of the market-wide bubble 
deviation, while for the return in the collapsing regime (C,B,I), it is negative as expected, albeit not 
significantly so. The probability of being in the surviving regime is, as expected, a negative and highly 
significant function of the size of the market bubble. The second panel of Table 2 reports the likelihood 
ratio test statistics for restrictions of the model to several simpler alternatives as discussed above. In 
addition, the final row tests the null hypothesis that the lagged market-wide bubble size and volume terms 
are not statistically significant. The latter restriction is clearly rejected for nine of the ten sectors, indicating 
that not only sector-specific changes in the size of the bubble and of abnormal volume but also market-wide 
influences are important determinants of subsequent bubble behavior at the sector level.  
 
In order to determine more specifically whether the bubble-like behavior in the sectors and the market as a 
whole emanate from a small number of specific industries, Table 3 reports the analysis for the unrestricted 
model where the next period returns are a function of the current size of the bubble and of abnormal volume 
not only in that sector but also in all of the other sectors. The table is organized so that each column 
represents estimation for the next period returns to the sector given by the column header, with the blocks 
of rows representing the lagged variables. Thus the parameter estimates corresponding to the own lags are 
on the leading diagonal.  
 
Table 3 shows that the expected returns in the surviving and collapsing regimes and the probability of the 
bubble surviving respond to a much greater extent to the lagged bubble sizes and lagged volumes in some 
sectors than others. Notably, Cyclical Services, Financials, Basic Industries and General Industries seem to 
be highly responsive while Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods and Utilities appear to be relatively isolated. 
Perhaps more importantly, in terms of the statistical significance of the parameter estimates, it appears that 
the bubbles in the Basic Industries, Cyclical Consumer Goods, Information Technology and Resources 
sectors are particularly contagious from the perspective that the bubbles in these sectors influence the levels 
and probability of collapse of a considerable number of other sectors. For example, the size of the bubble in 
the IT sector affects either the size of the return in the surviving or collapsing regime or the probability of 
the bubble surviving for the Cyclical Services, Financials, Basic Industries, General Industrials, Cyclical 
Consumer Goods, Non-Cyclical Services and Resources sectors. On the other hand, bubbles specific to the 
Utilities and Non-Cyclical Services sectors, for instance, have very limited spillovers to other industries. 
Although the very large number of parameters involved in this model makes interpretation a difficult task, 
the most salient feature is that bubble transmission at the sector level is multi-directional and did not 
originate purely from Information Technology and related industries.  
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The final panel of Table 3 shows likelihood ratio tests of restrictions of the general model that incorporates 
lagged influences from all other sectors to five simpler alternatives. The last two of these restrictions are to 
the augmented model with no spillovers and to the augmented model with market-wide bubble size and 
volume terms respectively. The results show that the model with spillovers is preferred to the univariate 
augmented model for all ten sectors, although it is preferred to the much more parsimonious model with 
market-wide terms for only four of them at the 5% significance level (Basic Industries, Cyclical Consumer 
Goods, Financials and Resources). 
 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, we examined the presence of periodically collapsing speculative bubbles in the S&P 500 and 
its constituent sectors. Market practitioners and academic researchers have suggested that the Information 
Technology and Resources sectors were significantly affected by speculative bubbles in the last 25 years, 
but by implication, that other sectors remained bubble-free. To our knowledge, we are the first directly to 
test for the presence of bubbles in specific stock market sectors, and we believe that our findings shed light 
on the behavior of these sector indices.  
 
We employ data for the 10 GICS sectors for the period January 1973 – June 2004. These indices represent 
the ten major economic sectors of the member firms (Cyclical Services, Financials, Basic Industries, 
General Industrials, Cyclical Consumer Goods, IT, Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods, Non-cyclical Services, 
Resources, and Utilities). Using a fundamental measure based on dividend-multiples, we estimate two 
speculative behavior models: a model by van Norden and Schaller (1997), and an augmented model 
proposed by Brooks and Katsaris (2005b). Furthermore, we estimate five alternative models that capture 
stylized facts about securities returns and that are nested within the speculative behavior models. This is 
done in order to test whether the speculative behavior models capture any additional information about the 
variation of returns.  
 
From the results, we can conclude that the augmented speculative behavior model has superior explanatory 
power to all of the alternative models for 4 out of 10 sectors. Thus, for the sample examined, the S&P 500 
Composite and these 4 sectors appear to contain a bubble. The bubbly sectors are Financials, Information 
Technology, General Industrials and Non-Cyclical Services. There is also some evidence of bubble-like 
behavior in 3 other sectors. In most cases, we found that the size of the bubble deviation and the measure of 
abnormal volume are significant predictors of returns. Although the relationships between the probabilities 
of being in a particular regime and the size of the bubble, the measure of abnormal volume and the spread 
of actual returns vary considerably across sectors, for all sectors, the probability of observing the collapsing 
regime is positively related to the absolute bubble size and the measure of abnormal volume. We find that 
the probability of the bubble continuing to exist decreases dramatically for large bubble sizes and abnormal 
  
 19 
volume realizations. Even though the augmented model yields a large and persistent probability of the 
collapsing regime for five years of the sample without a crash actually occurring, in 2000 the IT index lost 
50% of its value, and by August 2002, the IT index was down 80% from its all time high. Note that the 
estimated bubble deviation when the IT index peaked in March 2000 was 91%. This could be evidence that 
investors have now driven prices in this index back towards its dividend-based fundamentals. 
 
We show that a mixture of normals and a fads model better explain the Resources and the Utilities indices 
respectively than a speculative bubble model. Although some practitioners claim that a bubble was formed 
in the early 1980s in the global basic materials sector, we find no evidence that the perceived bubble 
deviations displayed periodically collapsing speculative bubble behavior during our sample period since the 
size of the bubble is unable significantly to predict the level or the generating state of returns.  
 
One particularly interesting observation is that towards the end of our sample after the IT bubble had begun 
to deflate, there is an increase in the deviations of actual prices from fundamental values in the four sectors 
with the lowest bubble deviations in March 2000. These sectors were Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods, 
Financials, Resources and Utilities. This could be taken as evidence that investors shifted their capital to 
sectors with a smaller probability of a bubble collapse, since very few investors would completely liquidate 
their holdings in the S&P 500. This could also be thought of as suggesting that market participants were 
aware that some sectors had a smaller bubble deviation than others, and were thus less at risk from the 
bubble bursting in 2000 and 2001. 
 
We additionally propose and implement an approach that can allow for contagion in bubbles between one 
sector and another. Since such models are highly parameter-intensive, we demonstrate several ways in 
which they can be simplified. The results show that bubble-transmission over our sample period arose from 
several sectors including Cyclical Consumer Goods and Basic Industries and not just from IT as popular 
opinion might suggest.  
 
To summarize, our central conclusion is that bubble-like behavior is not confined to a small segment of the 
stock market, but appears to be present in more than 70% of it. A key implication of this result is that if 
market participants believe dividend-based fundamental measures not to be appropriate for valuing the 
technology stocks, they are equally inappropriate for companies in other, more conventional, sectors and for 
the market as a whole.  
 
This research suggests several potentially useful lines of further research enquiry. First, it ought to be 
worthwhile to consider further refinements to the bubble spillovers model so that it might be parameterized 
more parsimoniously. For example, an approach based on principal components could be used to reduce the 
dimensionality of the system. Second, from an asset allocation perspective, it would be of interest to 
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determine whether approaches based on estimating separate bubble models for each sector could be used to 
time the market. A trading rule so-formed would buy into sectors where a bubble was in the early stages of 
growing and would switch into less bubbly sectors when the probability of bubble collapse became 
unacceptably high. Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) suggest that hedge funds were implicitly able to do this 
in the context of the recent rise and fall of the technology sector.  
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Table 1: Results of Augmented Bubble Model Including Volume for S&P 500 Composite Index and Individual Sectors, 1973-2004 
 
S&P 500 
Composite 
Cyclical 
Services 
Financials 
Basic 
Industries 
General 
Industrials 
Cyclical 
Consumer 
Goods 
IT 
Non-
Cyclical 
Consumer 
Goods 
Non-
cyclical 
Services 
Resources Utilities 
0,S
 
1.0186*** 1.0092*** 1.0066*** 1.003*** 1.0136*** 1.0101*** 1.0224*** 1.0095*** 1.0119*** 1.006*** 1.008*** 
BS ,
 
0.0227** 0.0073 0.0246* 0.0116 0.0825** 0.0186* 0.0582*** 0.0056 0.0225** 0.0049 -0.0265*** 
VS ,
 
-0.0287* 0.0192 -0.0351* 0.0021 -0.0271* -0.0068 -0.0108*** -0.0091 -0.0163 -0.0067 -0.0308** 
0,C
 
0.9874*** 0.9896*** 1.0746*** 1.0225*** 1.0074*** 0.9927*** 0.9624*** 1.0025*** 1.0001*** 1.0212*** 1.1009*** 
BC ,
 
-0.0308** -0.0619* -0.2063*** -0.1014* -0.0434** -0.093** -0.0394*** -0.0464 -0.0394** -0.0542* -0.0611** 
0,q
 
1.0596** 1.375* 2.3178*** 1.2909** 0.9866** 1.2927*** 5.6283*** 1.7204*** 2.0864*** 1.2189*** 2.8254*** 
Bq,
 
-1.7218** -0.4902 -4.2231** -1.0328 -7.2097*** -1.6744** -7.9493*** -0.9381 -3.6056*** -2.131** -3.4791*** 
Vq,
 
1.7475 -1.1952 -2.0186* 0.0599 4.0695** 1.4841 3.3336*** -2.3560 -0.0743 -0.2023 -1.4393* 
S
 0.0309*** 0.0455*** 0.0458*** 0.0466*** 0.0345*** 0.0437*** 0.0644*** 0.0395*** 0.0333*** 0.0404*** 0.0378*** 
C
 0.0482*** 0.081*** 0.0725*** 0.0999*** 0.062*** 0.0773*** 0.0642*** 0.0877*** 0.0649*** 0.0809*** 0.0263*** 
Log-Likelihood 585.6404 498.3641 551.9367 520.1957 529.3589 529.8356 420.4412 602.2093 587.2085 551.2288 642.4781 
AIC -3.4993 -2.9688 -3.0108**** -2.8344 -3.1193 -2.8880 -2.4215 -3.2901 -3.3461 -3.0068 -3.5138 
SIC -3.3840 -2.8534 -2.9028 -2.7265 -3.0049 -2.7800 -2.3086 -3.1821 -3.2347 -2.8989 -3.4058 
HQIC -3.4533 -2.9227 -2.9678 -2.7915 -3.0737 -2.8451 -2.3765 -3.2471 -3.3018 -2.9639 -3.4708 
0,0, CS  
 
4.0789** 0.6926 7.1171*** 0.8743 0.5808 0.5804 17.4077*** 0.1142 1.3053 0.9479 8.8072*** 
0, BC
 
1.6865 3.9269** 9.0845*** 3.227* 3.9908** 2.3599 16.2619*** 0.6558 5.0344** 1.7849 2.1925 
BCBS ,,  
 
3.6458* 2.7878* 9.101*** 3.3051* 6.6319** 2.5068 28.7586*** 0.7210 6.4252** 1.2187 0.7986 
0, VS
 
4.5432** 0.4256 5.7825** 0.7481 12.3438*** 0.1997 45.2912*** 0.3513 11.4435*** 2.7657* 4.8396** 
0, Bq
 
6.4481** 0.2476 2.2665 0.0022 7.4216*** 0.0038 4.7633** 1.7532 0.0070 0.0366 0.9632 
0, Vq
 
1.4474 0.5390 3.2597* 0.0140 1.6353 0.3598 0.0984 0.1751 1.3676 0.1260 0.3806 
Volatility Regimes  14.2581** 7.4978 20.3043*** 1.5772 11.1616* 2.0901 42.0594*** 2.3541 30.5537*** 3.6851 11.5185* 
Mixture of Normals 7.1192 6.8909 16.9410*** 4.8116   15.1737*** 3.2830 45.4128*** 4.3627 30.8772*** 4.9927  4.9710 
Fads  16.5008*** 6.5592 17.1395*** 5.0683  13.9322** 3.3936 45.3888*** 4.4522 34.6006*** 4.0123  7.9823 
Notes: The model is given by 
S
t
x
tVStbSSt uVBr 1,,0,1    , 
C
ttbCCt uBr 1,0,1    , )(),()( ,,0,1
x
tVqtbqq
x
ttt VBVBqSWP    with variable definitions given in 
the text. The second and third panels present likelihood ratio statistics which test restrictions that should hold for the bubble model to be a useful predictor and classifier of returns and to a set of 
simpler models respectively. *, ** and *** denote rejection of the null at the 90%, 95% and 99% confidence levels.  
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Table 2: Results of Augmented Bubble Model Including Volume and Lagged Market Bubble Size and Market Volume for Individual Sectors, 1973-2004 
 
Cyclical 
Services 
Financials 
Basic 
Industries 
General 
Industrials 
Cyclical 
Consumer 
Goods 
IT 
Non-
Cyclical 
Consumer 
Goods 
Non-
cyclical 
Services 
Resources Utilities 
0,S
 
0.9905*** 1.0139*** 0.9812*** 1.0059*** 1.0066*** 1.9351*** 0.9899*** 1.0128*** 1.0005*** 1.0112*** 
BS ,
 
-0.2644*** -0.1846*** -0.2004*** -0.2904*** -0.0370 5.0721*** -0.1367*** -0.1290*** -0.1048*** -0.1339*** 
VS ,
 
0.0875*** -0.0149 0.0368 0.0601 0.0143 -4.4209*** 0.0359 0.0048 0.0351 -0.0070 
0,C
 
1.0081*** 5.1304 1.0447*** 2.0282*** 1.4387*** 1.0128*** 1.1540*** 1.0303*** 1.0401*** 0.7529*** 
BC ,
 
-0.3895*** -8.5613 -0.0786 -3.9612*** -0.4547*** 0.0464* 0.0675 -0.1150 0.3155** -0.2160* 
0,q
 
3.6805*** 7.0812 1.4824*** 4.5520 2.6108 -23.1501*** 2463.4632 4.1505*** 6.2739*** 6.3754*** 
Bq,
 
32.0605*** -0.8042 1.3570 -21.8595 0.9888 -15.9948*** -2599.1907 9.7092** 29.1776** -0.8078 
Vq,
 
-11.5645*** -1.0157 -0.9073 -3.8705 -4.6352* -2.4918*** -2442.1464 0.9234 -2.4473 1.1361 
S
 
0.0474*** 0.0518*** 0.0398*** 0.0468 0.0545*** 1.1310*** 0.0423*** 0.0357*** 0.0487*** 0.0361*** 
C
 
0.0144*** 0.3891 0.0605*** 0.0010 0.0010 0.0758*** 0.0414*** 0.0659*** 0.0610*** 0.0470*** 
IBS ,,
 
0.3558*** 0.1436*** 0.2872*** 0.2605 0.0429 7.6491*** 0.1780*** 0.1680*** 0.0968*** 0.1009*** 
IVS ,,
 
-0.0826** 0.0199 -0.0481 -0.0442 -0.0179 -1.9571*** -0.0441 -0.0388* -0.0585** -0.0280* 
IBC ,,
 
-0.4085*** -0.9301 -0.0665 0.8795** -1.5729*** -0.0753* -0.3179** 0.0269 -0.0306 0.5862*** 
IBq ,,
 
-34.1712*** -1.0361 -5.3814*** 16.5431 -0.6100 -10.5800*** -2528.0929 -18.6835*** -28.6416*** -11.5833** 
IVq ,,
 
8.9132** -0.8296 3.8272** 8.4727 5.8865 -2.1070** 2132.0731 1.5539 0.5002 4.5067* 
Volatility Regimes 112.9696*** 23.7536*** 65.8893*** 84.9888*** 12.8359 0.3169 51.7346*** 61.4459*** 30.5902*** 50.9033*** 
Mixture of Normals 114.2201*** 20.3904*** 69.1237*** 87.2057*** 14.0287 2.6648 53.7431*** 62.1038*** 31.8977*** 44.3559*** 
Fads 114.2609*** 20.5889*** 69.3804*** 87.3704*** 14.1393 2.4465 53.8326*** 65.5218*** 30.9174*** 47.3671*** 
Augmented Model 98.1606*** 13.7874*** 64.3122*** 80.5064*** 10.4131* 0.0000 78.3386*** 27.1848*** 52.7603*** 47.5413*** 
Notes: The model is given by S
t
x
ItIVSItIbS
x
tVStbSSt uVBVBr 1,,,,,,,,0,1    , 
C
tItIbCtbCCt uBBr 1,,,,0,1    , )(),()( ,,,,,,,,0,1
x
ItIVqItIbq
x
tVqtbqq
x
ttt VBVBVBqSWP  
 with 
variable definitions given in the text. The second panel presents the likelihood ratio statistics for tests of restrictions to a set of simpler models. *, ** and *** denote rejection of the null at the 90%, 
95% and 99% confidence levels.  
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Table 3: Results of Bubble Spillovers Model Including Lagged Bubble Size and Lagged Volume from All Ten Sectors, 1973-2004 
  Dependent Variables 
Independent 
Variables 
 
Parameter 
Cyclical 
Services 
Financials Basic 
Industries 
General 
Industrials 
Cyclical 
Consumer 
Goods 
IT Non-Cyclical 
Consumer 
Goods 
Non-
Cyclical 
Services 
Resources Utilities 
Constant 0,S
 1.0208*** 1.0225*** 1.0242*** 1.0139*** 1.0263*** 1.3264*** 1.0143** 1.0163*** 1.0179*** 1.0101*** 
Constant 0,C  0.8511*** 1.1086*** 1.1787*** 0.9822*** 1.4400*** 1.0081*** -0.0178 1.1746 1.0476*** 2.6601 
Constant 0,q  5.3630*** 94.0263*** 47.3579** 6.9964*** 5.5706** -3.0636 26.9564 21.3602*** 2151.2003 5.1465 
Constant S  0.0500*** 0.0487*** 0.0505*** 0.0476*** 0.0468*** 0.2495 0.0422 0.0439*** 0.0473*** 0.0393*** 
Constant C  0.0012*** 0.0010 0.0010 0.0011*** 0.0010 0.0745*** 0.0010 0.0010 0.0189*** 0.4113 
Cyclical Services BS ,
 -0.0850* -0.0417 -0.0288 -0.0176 -0.0276 -0.1633 -0.0036 -0.0512 -0.0055 0.0143 
Cyclical Services BC ,
 -1.9818*** -3.6896*** -3.9395*** -2.8932*** -3.3476*** 0.0085 -5.2194 -1.2263 0.9037*** -5.1549 
Cyclical Services Bq,
 -4.0061 -23.9527 -43.0219** -6.3126* 0.4281 -1.6582 -4.8420 -2.9367*** -2428.7887 -0.2566 
Cyclical Services VS ,
 0.0677* 0.0251 -0.0088 0.0705** 0.0449 0.2546 0.0236 0.0255 -0.0058 0.0018 
Cyclical Services 
Vq,
 -8.5597*** -106.7719*** -0.1950 0.9015 -8.0186** 0.0331 44.2501 4.5244** -1653.6901 0.3681 
Financials BS ,
 0.1006** -0.0083 0.0638* 0.0596* 0.0671 -0.0916 0.0564 0.0060 -0.0097 -0.0231 
Financials BC ,
 -0.0052 -2.2209*** 4.3325*** 0.3823*** -3.4180*** 0.0350 -1.0737 0.8763 2.0505*** -5.7700 
Financials Bq,
 -2.5090 -100.2294*** -58.8132** -0.8735 0.1188 -1.2145 -58.4438 -5.6785*** -1018.0476 -0.5453 
Financials VS ,
 0.0244 -0.0191 -0.0024 -0.0342 0.0445 0.5736 0.0037 0.0154 0.0198 0.0019 
Financials 
Vq,
 -8.7254*** 11.7304** 123.2583** 0.4161 -1.0598 0.1426 18.1092 0.7556 3158.6089 -0.1282 
Basic Industries BS ,
 -0.0071 0.0081 0.0378 0.0351 0.0444 0.4987 0.0259 0.0098 0.0880*** -0.0199 
Basic Industries BC ,
 0.2667** -4.9518*** -4.7453*** -1.8866*** -5.0659*** 0.0232 -5.5617 -11.8384** -3.1893*** -0.6015 
Basic Industries Bq,
 3.1526 118.2383*** 3.9511 -1.9280 9.9398 -1.1774 16.4504 5.8971*** 1296.1547 -0.1096 
Basic Industries VS ,
 0.0928*** 0.0215 0.0332 0.0350 0.0635** -0.0260 0.0329 -0.0092 -0.0218 -0.0263 
Basic Industries 
Vq,
 1.0375 -13.2562*** -71.7334** 0.7331 -2.7629** -0.0212 42.3712 -4.6970*** -2288.9338 0.0622 
General Industrials BS ,
 -0.0910* -0.0393 -0.1341** -0.1420*** -0.0577 -0.1503 -0.0870 -0.0008 -0.0258 0.0126 
General Industrials BC ,
 -1.0422*** 0.8706 -2.5255*** -0.5948*** 1.5183*** -0.1893*** 0.1632 5.6994 -1.5786*** 1.7607 
General Industrials Bq,
 -23.9235*** -237.6526*** -94.5220** -6.9172 -7.1158 -1.2536 -3.3474 5.6445*** -313.9704 0.0827 
General Industrials VS ,
 -0.0467 -0.0457 -0.0059 0.0310 -0.0242 0.1494 -0.0065 0.0084 -0.0123 0.0043 
General Industrials 
Vq,
 -0.9577 103.9577*** 42.2771** 1.4426 7.5886 0.1380 -14.5121 0.8238 -586.9348 -0.1694 
Cyclical Consumer Goods BS ,
 -0.0551* -0.0493* -0.0863** -0.0395 -0.0908*** 0.2177 -0.0787 0.0104 -0.0500* -0.0026 
Cyclical Consumer Goods BC ,
 -0.3131*** 5.6310*** -2.6936*** 0.4596*** 3.1439*** -0.0180 3.8262 7.8083* 1.4890*** -5.5961 
Cyclical Consumer Goods Bq,
 7.0866** -27.3120*** 31.8614 1.3046 -2.3029 -1.3104 15.2511 -8.5779*** 2259.5074 -0.1795 
Cyclical Consumer Goods VS ,
 -0.0630** -0.0273 -0.0482** -0.0548** -0.0363 -0.0190 -0.0319 -0.0210 -0.0701*** -0.0488** 
Cyclical Consumer Goods 
Vq,
 0.0171 -33.5130*** 6.7443 2.2407** 0.8306 0.2094 -51.3280 -20.6840*** -1522.8705 -0.7357 
IT BS ,
 0.0695*** 0.0732*** 0.0849*** 0.0480** 0.0753** -0.1839 0.0611 0.0296* 0.0377** 0.0049 
IT BC ,
 0.9081*** -3.5741*** -1.9164*** -0.2351*** -1.1318*** 0.0443* 4.7513 0.2190 -0.6873*** 9.3789 
IT Bq,
 7.4795* -3.5430* -2.5529 5.4524* 1.8895 -3.4684 -18.0153 -4.7060*** 3540.4437 0.2565 
IT VS ,
 0.0048 0.0532** 0.0084 0.0070 -0.0519 -0.1382 -0.0015 -0.0323* 0.0160 -0.0032 
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  Dependent Variables 
Independent 
Variables 
 
Parameter 
Cyclical 
Services 
Financials Basic 
Industries 
General 
Industrials 
Cyclical 
Consumer 
Goods 
IT Non-Cyclical 
Consumer 
Goods 
Non-
Cyclical 
Services 
Resources Utilities 
IT 
Vq,
 2.8881* 9.9841** 5.8563 3.3995** 2.8964 -0.8976 -5.0175 15.9634*** 1911.7878 0.4755 
Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods BS ,
 0.0713* 0.0237 0.0215 -0.0084 0.0159 0.2862 -0.0404 0.0515* -0.0367 0.0223 
Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods BC ,
 -0.4757*** -1.3710 2.9596*** 0.1127*** 4.6554*** -0.0208 -4.0444 -2.2972 1.2815*** 1.8025 
Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods Bq,
 6.5905** 11.4096 34.5454* -0.8434 -6.4834 -1.1988 -15.3163 -3.8383* -5922.0681 0.1660 
Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods VS ,
 -0.0346 -0.0187 0.0263 -0.0350 -0.0366 0.1752 -0.0176 -0.0316 0.0411 0.0266 
Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods 
Vq,
 -4.4806* -134.3989*** -71.5682** -12.4497*** -6.1719 0.1286 -19.0856 -0.3591 -128.1544 0.4792 
Non-Cyclical Services BS ,
 -0.0482 -0.0400 -0.0707** 0.0371 -0.1515*** -0.1113 0.0082 -0.0317 -0.0436 0.0458 
Non-Cyclical Services BC ,
 2.4376*** 4.8498*** 4.6147*** 3.7269*** 2.1327*** 0.1012* -0.5018 1.6950 0.7705*** 3.4895 
Non-Cyclical Services Bq,
 2.4774 -62.9097*** -1.8750 -3.2554 -4.2270** -1.3774 60.5460** -15.8206*** -3789.8572 0.3127 
Non-Cyclical Services VS ,
 -0.0292** -0.0074 0.0075 -0.0135 -0.0112 -0.0666 -0.0112 -0.0113 -0.0133 -0.0070 
Non-Cyclical Services 
Vq,
 0.6619 47.3218*** -54.9774* -0.1756 2.6090 0.1148 5.6562 23.3812*** 888.0552 0.0893 
Resources BS ,
 -0.0456* -0.0673*** -0.0757*** -0.0450** -0.1045*** -1.0305 -0.0539 -0.0520*** -0.0662*** -0.0360** 
Resources BC ,
 -0.4737*** 5.0891*** 5.0672*** 0.6703*** 0.0104 -0.0388 6.4065 -6.5111* 0.6321*** -3.5904 
Resources Bq,
 0.3222 31.4004* -5.6513 3.6990** -7.9814 -1.3119 -12.9559 8.4456*** -1363.0846 0.6758 
Resources VS ,
 -0.0355* 0.0116 -0.0227 -0.0318 -0.0162 0.4347 -0.0020 0.0305* 0.0424** 0.0271 
Resources 
Vq,
 8.5458*** -11.4180* 34.1881*** 3.3013** -1.4795 0.1313 -22.1181 -14.2386*** 285.8898 -0.0260 
Utilities BS ,
 0.0690* 0.0842** 0.1271*** 0.0237 0.2106*** -0.0665 0.0587 0.0080 0.0762* -0.0704** 
Utilities BC ,
 0.3450*** 1.2004** -0.6448*** -0.0156 0.6860*** -0.0033 0.5190 0.6783 -2.9751*** -7.0657 
Utilities Bq,
 -1.2781 249.9852*** 124.6569** -3.2515* 10.9064 -1.0204 -5.0214 2.8133** 5178.5693 -1.4498 
Utilities VS ,
 -0.0066 -0.0195 -0.0022 0.0114 -0.0297 0.9266 -0.0215 -0.0130 -0.0079 -0.0057 
Utilities 
Vq,
 11.1089*** 106.6774*** -4.5222 0.5734 3.3115 0.0293 17.1441 13.8373*** 515.7842 -0.2057 
Volatility Regimes 150.0727*** 154.8886*** 182.8337*** 129.5272*** 175.3643*** 12.4096 102.4392*** 87.8353*** 106.4341*** 30.7490 
Mixture of Normals 151.3232*** 151.5254*** 186.0681*** 131.7440*** 176.5571*** 14.7575 104.4477*** 88.4932*** 107.7417*** 24.2015 
Fads 151.3639*** 151.7239*** 186.3248*** 131.9087*** 176.6677*** 14.5393 104.5372*** 91.9112*** 106.7614*** 27.2128 
Augmented Model 135.2637*** 144.9224*** 181.2565*** 125.0447*** 172.9415*** 0.0000 129.0432*** 53.5742 128.6043*** 27.3870 
Agumented model + market-wide bubble terms 37.1031 131.1350*** 116.9444*** 44.5383 162.5284*** 12.0928 50.7046 26.3894 75.8440*** 0.0000 
Notes: The model is given by S
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 with variable definitions 
given in the text. The second panel presents the likelihood ratio statistics for tests of restrictions to a set of simpler models. *, ** and *** denote rejection of the null at the 90%, 95% and 99% 
confidence levels.  
 27 
Figure 1: S&P 500 Information Technology Price Index and Dividend Yield 
January 1973 – June 2004 
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Figure 2: S&P 500 General Industrials Price Index and Dividend Yield 
January 1973 – June 2004 
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Figure 3: S&P 500 Resources Price Index and Dividend Yield 
January 1973 – June 2004 
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